1 proponent/opponent? … the present knowledge of suffering clearly comprehends present suffering. proponent At the time when the body … 2 noble truth. If [one states], opponent “It is suffering,” proponent … present … 3 one abides observing the body. It should be asked, “Does mindfulness of the body take feelings as its object-support?” 4 [Even] if [you respond that mindfulness of the body] does not take [feelings] as its object-support, surely [you would admit that] the nature of suffering becomes [an object-support] in gradual clear comprehension. If one states, 5 opponent “… one sees various distinguishing characteristics,” proponent by means of which knowledge does one clearly comprehend suffering? Some self- … 6 It should be asked, “How many [instances of] the knowledge of suffering [are there]?” If one states, 7 opponent …

… knowledge …

… some …

… will … six … of eight …

1 … proponent in the case of one division [of past action], the matured effect has occurred, [and] in the case of another division [of past action], the matured effect has not occurred. 2 … Or else, one who has acquired arhatship possesses [prior action, specifically that of] taking life, whose matured effect has not yet matured. 3 And is it possible for a [future] factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising? They state, opponent “The state of not being possessed of a matured effect, the state of being a matured effect, [and action] whose matured effect has not yet matured 4 [all] exist.”

proponent It should be said that if that “state of not being possessed of a matured effect” exists, this matured effect [exists] due to the non-destruction of its cause. 5 It should be said that [if] that action, [even though] not possessed of a matured effect, is existent, the matured effect is not nonexistent. [However,] if [one states], opponent “This [action] is past,” 6 proponent [then] the matured effect does not exist. [As for] the “state of being a matured effect,” since [one states] opponent “It is not possessed of a matured effect,” proponent the past …

… has not occurred …

1 … 2 … not without distinction. Then that is not … by which … it is possible for another … in the past … 3 … without distinction. … sense sphere exists. … sense sphere … 4 … exists.” If it should be said that it is possible for a matured effect …, the matured effect … 5 … of the unvirtuous … virtuous (or, unvirtuous) …

3 … the fruit, that does not … 4 … occurred / not occurred … 5 …

… In that case, that matured effect …

… or destruction. … the matured effect of that …

… by means of … matured effect …

… of past action …

… [one states], opponent “Yes.” proponent One states opponent …

1 proponent … in some way acts as the cause of the sprout. And therefore, certainly it is not the case that 2 precisely these past [factors] and future [factors], so long as they are unborn in this way, would act as in some way the cause of that. 3 And yet the matured effect certainly has action as its cause, for it is not [claimed] that the cause of maturation is [something] other than action.

(1) proponent Then for what reason [does one state], 4 opponent “Past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists?” proponent One states, opponent “[It is] in accordance with the fact that it is possessed of a fruit.” 5 proponent (With regard to that it should be said that) if the reason [constituted by] the fruit is the reason for existence, then that [action], which is possessed of a fruit, exists, [and inversely] that [action], which is not 6 (possessed of a fruit, does not) exist. And if [one states], opponent “[Action] exists due to the fact that it is possessed of a fruit,” proponent then the fruit 7 should be presented at all times since existence is [understood] as the acquisition of fruits from causes.

(2) proponent It should be asked, 8 “[Is it the case that] present [action] (whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) for the same reason that (past) [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists, [namely, due to the fact that it is possessed of a fruit,] 9 (and as a result of that,) past [action] (whose matured effect has not yet matured exists) [and] present [action] 10 (whose matured effect has not yet matured exists)?” If one states, opponent “Yes,” proponent with regard to that it should be said in accordance with this proposition, 11 since the matured effect of past [action] exists, 12 then [similarly], if that [present action] exists, as a result of that, [its] matured effect occurs in the present. If one states, 13 opponent “It does occur [in the present],” proponent then there is a concurrence of both action and [its] matured effect [in the present, which is precluded by the successive nature of karmic causal functioning]. Or else, [the matured effect of present action] does not occur [in the present]. 14 Then present [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured does not exist [since it cannot be said to be possessed of a fruit.] Or else, present [action] whose matured effect (has not yet matured) exists [as possessed of a fruit], 15 and yet its matured effect does not occur. [Then, your prior] proposition, 16 “present [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured exists for the same reason that past [action] (whose matured effect has not yet matured exists),” 17 does not hold.

(3) proponent It should be asked, “Should it further be said that the [matured effect, which occurs] through that action, 18 belongs to others and is not (one’s own)?” If one states, opponent “[The matured effect] should be brought about (as one’s own),” proponent then it should not be said in the case of the Buddha that 19 he is one for whom the [matured effect of] action, [which occurs] through that [action], is his own. [This is because] it is held [in the scriptures] that he is not one for whom the [matured effect of] unvirtuous action is his own. Or else, it should not be said that [the matured effect of action] is one’s own. 20 [In that case,] by means of which [actions is it said that] one experiences that matured effect which occurs?

(4) 21 proponent It should be asked, “From which action does the matured effect occur?” If one states, opponent “The matured effect [occurs] from past [action],” 22 proponent with regard to that it should be said, “And which is that [past action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, of which the matured effect occurs?”

(5) 23 One asks, opponent “Is there some action whose matured effect exists, or is there no action 24 whose matured effect exists?” proponent It should be said that there is some action whose matured effect exists, [as indicated by the following scriptural passages]. [For example,] 25 “A little bit of loving kindness [results in] a fruit; that loving kindness exists, and that fruit exists.” 26 [Or] it is proclaimed, “For this [praise] is a small thing, insufficient for tranquility. I say there are two fruits of dispute.” 27 [Or] it is proclaimed, “For those fruits are to be anticipated by causes.” [Or] “I say that conception has conventional speech as its matured effect. In whatever way 28 one conceives, in that way one declares, ‘It exists in this way.’ And the fruit of that [conception] exists.”

(6) 29 proponent It should be asked, “Is there some action that exists, or is there no action that exists?” opponent “There is some action [that exists, namely,] 30 past [action] whose matured effect has not yet matured, which constitutes one part within the region of the past.” proponent If [action whose matured effect has not yet matured exists as possessed of a fruit and] constitutes one part [of the past], then the fruit should be presented by both 31 [parts, that is, by past action whose matured effect has not yet matured and by past action whose matured effect has already matured]. [It should be said that] either both [parts of the past] exist [as possessed of a fruit] or both do not exist [as not possessed of a fruit].

(7) proponent Is there some action whose matured effect has not yet matured, 32 of which the matured effect will not occur at all? If one states, opponent “There is action (whose) matured effect 33 will not occur,” proponent then that action is not [to be referred to as action] “whose matured effect has not yet matured.” Or else, [if] there were no action whose 34 matured effect will not occur, there would be no life of religious practice. For it has been spoken thus by the Bhagavat, 35 “[If it is said that] in whatever way this one instigates an action, in that way one experiences the matured effect, then there is no life of 36 religious practice.”

(1) proponent It should be asked, “Is it possible for a future factor subject to arising, by virtue of [its] strength or energy, 37 to act as a factor not subject to arising?” If it is not possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], it is not a factor subject to arising since it is possible for a factor subject to arising 38 to act. Or else, [if] it is not possible [for a future factor subject to arising to act as a factor not subject to arising], the life of religious practice is without purpose.

(2) proponent If future factors subject to arising exist, 39 [and] future factors not subject to arising do not exist, to which of these [two categories] does the cessation of suffering in a life contrary to religious practice [belong]?

(3) Indeed, [you contend that] “a factor subject to arising 40 will inevitably arise, [and] a factor not subject to arising will inevitably not arise.” 41 When Aṅgulimāla, having killed human beings, wears a garland of finger bones, now how possibly 42 at that time is [his future] nature as a hell-being 43 either (a factor subject to arising), or else not a factor subject to arising? If it is a factor subject to arising, it is not possible for birth (to arise) there by means of that [action] 44 … for hell inevitably should not be reached by him. Or else, [if] it is a factor subject to arising, 45 then [there is] no life of religious practice [for him].

(4) One states, opponent “If [a factor] obtains a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] and reaches the point of arising, for that reason 46 it is [considered to be] a factor subject to arising.” proponent It should be said that, as a result of that, if [a factor merely] obtains a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions], for that reason [alone] it is [considered to be] a factor subject to arising.

(5) And it should be said that the Bhagavat states, “One cultivates right exertion for the sake of the non-arising of evil unvirtuous factors that have not arisen.” 48 Now how possibly are those evil unvirtuous factors either factors subject to arising, or else factors not subject to arising? 49 If they are factors not subject to arising, one cultivates right exertion without purpose. 50 Or else, [if] they are factors subject to arising and thereafter act as factors not subject to arising, the [previous] proposition is worsted: 51 [namely, that] “A factor subject to arising inevitably arises.”

(8) They state, opponent “From which action does the matured effect (occur: from past action), 52 or else from present [action]?” proponent (If) the matured effect occurs from present [action], as a result of that, [with regard to] that very corporeal moral conduct 53 that is stationed in the sixth sense sphere, now does that action cease after death, or else does it not cease? If it ceases, 54 [then the matured effect] occurs from past [action]. Or else, [if that present corporeal moral conduct] does not cease, there is an agent of that action. Further, if the matured effect of that [present action] 55 occurs, when one gains the first trance state after [that] action, has then [the present action] of that one ceased, 56 [or] not ceased? [If that present action] has not ceased, there is a contradiction of scripture, [which states,] “Speech has ceased for one who has gained the first trance state.” Or else, [if] 57 the matured effect of past (action) occurs, is then [that past] action possessed of a fruit, or else not possessed of a fruit? If one states, opponent “It is possessed of a fruit,” 58 proponent (with regard to that) it should be said, “How is it that there exists no [action] possessed of a fruit other than through [the existence of] the fruit?” And if there exists no [action] possessed of a fruit other than through [the existence of] the fruit, then there exists no father other than through [the existence of] the son. 59 And if that action, which is possessed of a fruit, is [also] possessed of a matured effect, then surely that action, which is possessed of a fruit, ceases together with its matured effect. 60 It should be said that just as that gold [as the cause], being possessed of a fruit, is consumed by fire in a crucible, isn’t it the case that that [cause] is consumed together with [its] fruit? In this way, [when] that action possessed of a fruit 61 has ceased, then surely it has ceased together with its matured effect. …

(6) 62 proponent (If) a future [factor] is a factor subject to arising, surely a future [factor] is a present factor. [It is] just like the case of the future noble path that is a factor subject to arising, 63 which, (as the stage of “not yet having reached,”) will act as a factor not subject to arising. Surely the noble path [of] the stage of “not yet having reached” will [still] act as future [and therefore must still be a factor subject to arising].

(7) (And) if 64 future [factors] are both factors subject to arising and factors not subject to arising, and a factor that is subject to arising will inevitably arise, 65 and a factor that is not subject to arising will not arise, then the life of religious practice is without purpose. Or else, it is possible 66 for a future factor (subject to arising) to act as a factor not subject to arising; therefore, a future [factor, as not subject to arising,] is unconditioned.

proponent You might wish to say, 67 opponent “Everything exists. Everything exists at all times. Everything exists everywhere. Everything exists with every aspect. (Everything exists) through every reason. 68 Everything exists through all modes. Everything exists through all causes. Everything exists through all conditions. 69 (Everything) exists.”

(1) opponent “That which exists is everything, and yet that which exists is not everything. Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres exist. 70 [Those factors] that belong to the three time periods, which are not confused, should be said to be existence. Or else, the time periods [should be said to be] existence. That which exists should indeed be said to be existence; 71 (that which does not exist) should indeed be said to be nonexistence. The existent should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be nonexistence. [Or] the past, future, 72 and present (should be said to be existence). A past year exists; a future year exists. 73 The modes of the past and future exist as past and future. The mode of the householder exists as past and future. The mode of the monastery worker exists as past and future. 74 The mode of the merchant exists as past and future. The mode of the arhat exists as future. 75 Everything exists.”

(2) opponent “It is not the case that everything exists; it is not the case that everything does not exist. A past [factor] without efficacy exists; [for example], an arhat possesses 76 past lust, [past] hatred, and [past] delusion. The past should be said to be the past alone; the future 77 should be said to be the future alone; the present should be said to be the present alone. Just as, 78 for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of pastness is established as having existence, in the same way, for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of futureness 79 is established as having existence, [and] in the same way, for the sake of the determination of the past, the intrinsic nature of presentness 80 is established as having existence. In this way, it should be applied in the case of the future, continuing on in this way through the unconditioned. 81 Or it should be said that the three characteristics of a conditioned [factor] are existence. And ‘everything’ [in] that [sense is suggested by the scripture passage that states], ‘I have longing internally’ …” 82

proponent The distinguisher asked about this [position elaborated previously by the opponent]. With regard to that there is a point of discussion, [that is, concerning] the Mahāsarvāstivādins [and their proposition] “everything exists.” With regard to that 83 the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, opponent “Certainly there is nothing that does not exist. Past, future, and present [conditioned factors] and unconditioned [factors] exist.”

(1) 84 [If] one states, opponent “(That which exists) is everything,” proponent it should be said that a soul exists, creaturehood exists, a person exists, a sixth 85 (aggregate) exists, a thirteenth sense sphere exists, a nineteenth element exists, and a fifth noble truth 86 (exists). [The statement,] “even that which does not exist also exists,” should not be upheld by hundreds of scriptures. “The existent 87 should be said to be existence; the nonexistent should be said to be the nonexistence.” In this way, it should be upheld by hundreds of scriptures.

(2) 88 (If) one states, opponent “There exists no soul, there exists no creaturehood, there exists no person, 89 there exists no sixth aggregate, there exists no thirteenth sense sphere, there exists no nineteenth element, there exists no fifth 90 noble truth,” proponent well then, it is you who maintain distinctions! [Since] you admit something to be existence and something to be nonexistence, isn’t it the case that it should not be said 91 that “everything exists?” If in that way there exists no fifth (noble) truth, there exists no sixth aggregate, there exists no 92 thirteenth sense sphere, there exists no nineteenth element, there exists no soul, there exists no creaturehood, there exists no person, 93 what is the object-support of this perceptual consciousness since this perceptual consciousness arises with the form of [these nonexistent entities]? 94 What is the object-support of this moment of thought, what is the sovereign condition, insofar as the “nature” of the object-support does not exist, [and yet] (that) [moment of] thought arises from four [conditions] 95 in that way?

(3) And [one states], opponent “That which exists is everything.” proponent And the visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, 96 the twelve sense spheres become the visual sense sphere. If [one states], opponent “[Since both] the material-form [sense sphere] and the visual sense sphere 97 exist, it is not the case that that [visual sense sphere] is everything,” proponent as a result of that, the [proposition,] “that which exists is everything,” is not upheld. [If you respond,] opponent “that which exists is in some cases everything 98 [and] in some cases not everything,” proponent it should be said that, as a result of that, everything in some cases [should be said to] exist [and] in some cases should not be said to exist.

(1) [One states,] opponent “Everything exists everywhere.” 99 proponent Therefore, the material-form sense sphere [exists] in the visual sense sphere, all natures exist in the nature of a hell-being, and so on, 100 other-nature exists in intrinsic nature, intrinsic nature exists in other-nature. If one states, opponent “It should not be said that everything 101 exists everywhere,” proponent with regard to that it should be said that it being thus, everything does not exist everywhere. 102 [Therefore, you should not maintain that everything exists but rather] something exists [and] something does not exist.

(2) [One states,] opponent “Everything exists in all [factors].” proponent Therefore, [even] impaired controlling faculties possess 103 future [unimpaired] controlling faculties, and hell-beings possess the four natures [of other beings]. In this way, 104 it should be upheld that the controlling faculties are everywhere.” If one states, opponent “It should not be said that everything exists in all [factors],” 105 proponent as a result of that in all [factors], something exists, [and] something does not exist. Now how possibly could it be said by you that “everything exists?”

(3) If 106 further opponent “everything exists as belonging to everything,” proponent one [sentient being] possesses a connection with the aggregates of another, the sense spheres of another, and the elements of another.

(4) 107 [One states,] opponent “Everything exists at all times.” proponent [In that case,] at the time before the meal, the time after the meal exists; at the time after the meal, 108 the time before the meal exists. At the present time, both future and past times 109 exist; and so on, it should be upheld by means of [other] times.

(5) [One states,] opponent “Everything exists with every aspect.” 110 proponent [In that case,] a future aspect exists with a past aspect; a past aspect exists with a future aspect. 111 The aspect of tranquility exists with the aspect of voidness; the aspect of voidness exists with the aspect of tranquility. The aspect of untruth 112 exists with the aspect of truth. The aspect of happiness exists with the aspect of suffering. The aspect of self exists with the aspect of non-self. 113 The aspect of non-self exists with the aspect of self. The aspect of what is not everything exists with the aspect of everything.

(6) Virtuous and unvirtuous [factors exist] by reason of past [factors], by reason of future [factors], and by reason of present [factors].

(7) And [as for the declarations concerning] all “modes,” [namely, “everything exists through all modes,”] and so on, it should be expanded by means of [similar applications of] insight.

(1) [One states,] opponent “Those [factors] that are included within the twelve sense spheres 116 exist. The visual sense sphere exists. Therefore, the visual sense sphere is included within the twelve sense spheres; 117 and so on, [the scope of] ‘everything’ should be expanded through the [other] sense spheres. It should be known that there exists no thirteenth sense sphere, continuing on through [the previously cited list], there exists no 118 soul, there exists no person, and so on.” proponent With regard to that it should be said, “By virtue of which perceptual consciousness or energy 119 should it be known that there exists no soul, there exists no person?” One states, opponent “[It is] by means of the mental sense sphere, by means of mental perceptual consciousness.” 120 proponent With regard to that it should be said that a fifth noble truth, nineteenth element, 121 soul, and person should be said to be factors [that are the object-support] of mental perceptual consciousness, for in this way it has been said, “Factors [are the object-support] of mental perceptual consciousness.” 122 Now if one admits that [these nonexistent entities are] factors, with regard to that it should be said that, as a result of that, certain factors exist 123 [and] certain factors do not exist.

(2) If one states, opponent “Or [those factors] that belong to the three time periods are existence,” proponent with regard to that it should be said that 124 undoubtedly a future [factor] is present, and a present [factor] is past. If one states, opponent “A [factor] having been future 125 becomes present, and having been present becomes past,” proponent with regard to that it should be said that 126 (one factor) possesses three “natures”: a past “nature,” a future “nature,” and 127 a present “nature.” If one states, opponent “Material form exists through [various] ‘modes,’ but there are not three [discrete factors of] material form,” proponent with regard to that 128 it should be said, “Now how is there the acquisition of a present ‘nature’ in the case of a future [first aggregate of] material form continuing on through [the fifth aggregate of] perceptual consciousness?” 129 One states, opponent “Material form possessed of a future ‘mode’ [comes to] be possessed of a present ‘mode’ due to the force of a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions].” proponent It should be said, 130 “Now does that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exist, or not exist?” If one states, opponent “[The complete collocation] exists,” proponent then the “nature” of material form in the present 131 is not material form, [but should instead be that of the separately existing complete collocation]. [Since you maintain that] in the past, there are three [“natures” of] material form, in the future, which “natures” [of material form] are future? 132 One states, opponent “In the future, a future ‘mode’ and a present ‘mode’ [of material form] are future.” proponent It should be said, “For what 133 reason is that [present ‘nature,’ if still future, said to be] present?” One states, opponent “[Because the present ‘mode’] is acquired. Or else, it possesses the present ‘mode’ due to the force of the complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions].” 134 One states, opponent “Now that complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists, [but] it does not exist at all ….”

(2–4?) 135 proponent/opponent? If … 136 … future,” of that … 137 … 138 … proponent … 139 past and future [factors] do not exist. And you say, opponent “(Due to the force) of a complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] … 140 ….” proponent If the complete collocation [of requisite causes and conditions] exists … 141 acts as a factor (not subject to arising). The future …

1 … proponent … (as a result of that,) it is held in the scripture that all [have not attained religious practice]. Or else, it is not the case in that way that all have not attained [religious practice] … 2 … exists … 3 … . … exists …

1 … for it should not be said … 2 … . There are future …

1 … 2 …. proponent If a future [factor] alone by virtue of [its] energy … 3 …

1 … proponent … the material form (sense sphere) within the twelve sense spheres … 2 it is not the case that [its] “nature” … . By means of which 3 (perceptual consciousness) will one perceive (its “nature” as material form)? One states, opponent “[It is perceived] by visual perceptual consciousness.” proponent With regard to that it should then be said that that “nature” 4 consists of material form, [since] visual perceptual consciousness should perceive material form. If one states, opponent “[It is perceived by] mental perceptual consciousness,” proponent then [its] “nature” 5 should be said to be [constituted by] the factor [sense sphere].

proponent It should be said that in the case of the existent, the existent exists; it should be said that in the case of the existent, the nonexistent does not exist. 6 [And yet,] the Mahāsarvāstivādins state, opponent “Certainly there is nothing that does not exist.” proponent [In that case,] there is certainly nothing nonexistent that does not exist. The four … 7 … in the case of the existent …, a “nature” exists; a “nature,” in the case of the nonexistent …, does not exist. With regard to this, the Mahāsarvāstivādins … 8 …

1 proponent/opponent? … not at all …. Or else that … 2 … it should be upheld in the case of …. Of material form … 3 … the attainment [of religious practice]. All sentient beings who … having attained/the attainment [of religious practice] … 4 …

1 … present … 2 …

4 … With regard to that it should be said …

1 … everything exists … 2 … past … past … 3 … proponent … should not be said. If one states, opponent “There is no attainment [of religious practice],” proponent it is not the case that suffering … 4 … should be upheld that “nature” …

… one having attained (or, not having attained) [religious practice] …

… both …

1 … proponent … one who has not attained [religious practice] … 2 … does not exist. That accompaniment of future [factors] also does not exist. [If one states,] opponent “It is the case that the attainment [of religious practice] exists,” proponent [then] by what means 3 does one who has not attained [religious practice become] one who has attained [religious practice]? In this way, future [factors] do not exist. 3 [One states,] opponent “A past year exists,” proponent [but] then 4 yet another [future] year is not possessed of [past] years. [One states,] opponent “A future year exists with future years.” If 5 [one states], opponent “One is accompanied by (future years),” proponent [then] an elder [should] also possess a [future] year, [but] indeed he is not accompanied by that [future year]. 5 proponent/opponent? Moral conduct 6 … opponent [one states], “… moral conduct is future,” proponent then all who are not observing moral conduct … moral conduct in entirety 7 …

1 … 2 … proponent … and together with future … present 3 … contaminant. (The attainment [of religious practice]) that is freed from lust 4 …, then that one for the sake of the future (attainment [of religious practice]) 5 … for the sake of the future [attainment of religious practice] that is freed from lust, … not [yet] freed from lust 6 … becomes … contaminant. For it is not the case that one states 7 … future …